The Washington Tax System—How It Grew by Harsch, Alfred
Washington Law Review 
Volume 39 
Number 5 Symposium: The Washington State 
Tax Structure 
1-1-1965 
The Washington Tax System—How It Grew 
Alfred Harsch 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alfred Harsch, The Washington Tax System—How It Grew, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 944 (1965). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol39/iss5/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
S MPOSRUM
THE WASHINGTON STATE TAX STRUCTURE
THE WASHINGTON TAX SYSTEM-HOW IT GREW
ALFRED HARSCH*
Since the establishment of Washington as a territory in 1854, the
state's taxing system has expanded from a simple two-tax program,
adequately serving the needs of its rough pioneer communities, into an
involved complex of multiple taxes, limited and confined either within
a rigid and strictly construed constitutional framework or by the outer
limits of economic and political feasibility. Whatever may be one's
belief with respect to the desirable extent of the governmental activities
and services of the state and its many subdivisions, there can be no
denying the proposition that the state's existing revenue system creaks,
groans, and mightily strains at the task of providing the funds neces-
sary to maintain the level of governmental activity which citizens and
organized groups require their representatives to maintain in the com-
plex of urban, suburban, and rural communities of the state.
THE TERRITORIAL TAX STRUCTURE
In 1854, when Washington was organized as a territory, the provi-
sions of the Territorial Organic Act1 with respect to the taxing power
were very brief. Power to tax the property of the United States was
expressly negatived and the lands or property of a non-resident could
not "be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents."
Equality and uniformity was required in the case of "all taxes," and
different kinds of property was to be assessed without distinction and
according to its value. The requirement of equality seemingly forbade
classification of, or the making of distinctions among, objects to which
any taking statute was to be applied. The specific provision demand-
ing no distinction in assessment made it doubly clear that the territorial
legislature was not authorized to establish different classes of property
for the purpose of imposing a tax thereon. Literal interpretation of the
equality provision of the Organic Act would seem to have likewise de-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
110 U.S. Stat. ch. 90, § 6 (1853).
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prived the territorial legislature of power to classify the subject to
which taxes other than property taxes were to be applied. However, if
this was the intended effect of the language, it was certainly not ob-
served in connection with the non-property taxes which were levied, or
authorized, by the territorial legislature. For example, the county poll
tax of 1854 taxed some citizens, or residents, while others were not
taxed.
At its first meeting in 1854 the territorial legislature provided for
the support of the territory, the counties, and the school districts by
levying a poll tax of one dollar upon all white males over the age of
twenty-one,2 and by taxing all property, real and personal. The legisla-
ture directed the county commissioners to levy for territorial purposes
one mill, for school district purposes two mills, and for county pur-
poses not to exceed four mills.3 The territorial and the county tax
levies were to apply to "every dollar's worth of real and personal
property."M
To the legislator of this early day there was no need for elaborate
definitions of property. One section related to personal property which
expressly included several common items of tangible personality, all
debts due, or to become due and specified stocks.5 Property exempt
from taxation was listed in a single six-line section.6
In addition to the poll tax and the property tax, the county commis-
sioners were authorized to license itinerant vendors, grocers, liquor
vendors, and operators of billiard tables, bowling alleys,' and ferries.'
As the end of the territorial period approached, the statutory provi-
sions relating to taxation had become more extensive and numerous
changes in tax administration procedures had been made, but reliance
still was almost wholly upon the poll tax and the property tax for the
support of the territorial government and its subdivisions. The de-
scription of taxable property had become a little more detailed;9 the
2 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 331. It specified that the proceeds of this tax
"shall go to the county."
3 Ibid. With respect to county tax for schools see also Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854,
at 319. Legal voters in school meetings could levy a tax on all property without a
millage limitation by a majority vote. Wash (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 326-27.
4Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 331.
5 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 332.
6 Only the following were listed: Property of religious, benevolent, charitable,
literary and scientific institutions, property of the Territory and its counties, school
property, public libraries, places of burial, and the property of Indians. Ibid.
7 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 330-38.8 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1854, at 354.
9 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, ch. 220, at 593.
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breaking of the wilderness barriers was evidenced by references in the
taxing statute to the property of railroad, telegraph, and telephone
companies,"0 as well as to the shares of banking associations;" the
county poll tax had been increased 2 and expanded;' 3 and the property
tax levy for territorial purposes had been raised. 4
Cities and Towns. During the territorial period the charter for
each city and town was enacted by special legislative act, and for this
reason the general statutes of the territory were devoid of any reference
to the taxes that were to be levied for city or town purposes. The
powers vested in the cities and towns by these special charters varied
in detail from charter to charter. In studying the provisions of seven
city charters enacted by the legislature at its 1881 session, 5 it appears
that all of the cities were granted the power to levy and collect taxes
on property within the city for municipal purposes. The maximum
rates permitted, however, varied from city to city, ranging from four
mills to ten mills. In some instances, levies in excess of the stipulated
maximum were permitted with the approval of voters, 6 while in other
instances additional levies might be made without voter approval,
17subject to varying provisions.
In each of the city charters mentioned, city officials (not always the
same ones) were empowered to list property and polls for the purpose
of municipal taxation, to prepare assessment rolls, to collect, and in
case of delinquency, and to enforce payment of the municipally levied
taxes. In each instance, however, the city assessor (or other official
performing this function) was directed to utilize the valuations of
property as determined by the county assessor for the purposes of
territorial, county, school district, and road taxes.
10 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, at 492-94.
11 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, at 492.
12 The increase was from $1 to $2 annually. Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, at 495-96.
13 A poll tax of $4 was imposed on males liable to perform labor on the public
roads. Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, at 518-19.
14 Rate for Territorial purposes was raised from 1 to 2% mills. The maximum
levy rates were specified as follows: for county purposes, 8 mills; school district pur-
poses, 6 mills; and road purposes, 5 mills. Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, at 498.
15 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, Local and Private Laws, under varying titles: City
of Olympia 51; New Tacoma 66; City of Dayton 87; City of Port Townsend 115;
City of Waitsburg 138; City of Colfax 157; City of Spokane Falls 148.
16 See, e.g., Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, Local and Special Laws, § 3, at 52 (Olympia)
and 143 (Waitsburg). Each city was granted power to levy and collect license taxes
for revenue purposes, but the powers so granted were not identical for each city.
Canpare, e.g., Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, Local and Private Laws, § 3, at 52-54
(Olympia), with Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, art. VI, § 1(7), at 144 (Waitsburg).
17 See, e.g., Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1881, Local and Special Laws, § 34(20), at 78
(New Tacoma) and § 15, at 91 (Dayton).
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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1889
At the inception of statehood in 1889, the drafters of the state's
constitution departed from the pattern of brevity in reference to the
subject of taxation that had been observed in the Territorial Organic
Act. The constitution of 1889 contained one article, of nine sections,
and two sections in another article which related wholly to taxation."8
References to the subject of taxation were also to be found in ten other
sections."9
The first two sections of article VII and the two sections in article
IX provided the basic framework of the constitutionally formulated
pattern for the revenue structure of the state. It appears that the two
sections in article XI relating to taxation of and for support of the
municipalities and other subdivisions of the state, were taken from
similar provisions of the 1879 constitution of the state of California. 0
The language of sections 1 and 2 of article VII, however, has no
counterpart in other state constitutions. Language similar in part to
the provisions of these two sections is found in the then-existing con-
stitutions of six states.2 The journal of the constitutional convention
is devoid of information relative to either the derivation, or the reasons
for selection, of the policy positions or the language of these constitu-
tional provisions..2  It has been suggested that the committee on rev-
enue and taxation of the constitutional convention must have put these
two sections together by borrowing sentences and parts of sentences
from the constitutions of the above mentioned six states."
Article VII, section 1: Article VII, which is entitled "Revenue and
Taxation," contains the basic framework of the state structure as it
was envisaged by the drafters of the constitution in 1889. The first
section provided that all property not otherwise exempt, "shall be
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law."
1s WASH. CONST. art. VII and art. XI, §§ 9, 12 (1889).
19 WASH. CONST. art II, § 28, cl. 5; art. IV, §§ 5, 6; art. VIII, § 6; art. IX
§ 2; art. XI, §§ 4, 13, 15; art. XII, § 17; and art. XXVI.
20 Beardsley, The Sources of the Washingtor Constitutim as Found in the Consti-
tutions of the Several States: Historical Notes in CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, 1889-1939, xxix (Golden Jubilee ed. 1939). These notes are also to be
found in each subsequent biennial edition of this pamphlet published by the Secretary
of State.21 California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Oregon, and Texas. The draft constitution
for the proposed state of Washington submitted to Congress in 1878 also contains
language similar in part. Id. at xxv.
22 THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889
at 649-58 (Rosenow ed. 1962).2 3 Beardsley, supra note 20, at xxiv.
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This section also directed the legislature to make provisions for an an-
nual tax levy, "sufficient, with other sources of revenue, to defray the
estimated ordinary expenses of the state for each fiscal year," as well
as for the payment of interest on state indebtedness and for its amor-
tization over a period of twenty years. It is obvious that the members
of the constitutional convention were thinking only in terms of condi-
tions as they then existed and contemplated that the property tax would
continue to constitute the mainstay of, and provide the element of flex-
ibility in, the total revenue structure. While the possibility of other
sources of revenue for state purposes was recognized, the property tax
levy was to supply the balance of income required to maintain current
operations at the state level and to retire those debt obligations which
might be incurred.24
Article VII, section 2-Requirement of Uniformity and Equality
of Treatment. The second section of article VII stated that "The
legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation on all property in the state, according to its value in
money.... ." This requirement, that "all property" be both assessed
and taxed at a "uniform and equal rate" forbade classification of prop-
erty either for the purpose of variation in the ratio of assessed to full
value for different types of property or for the purpose of variation in
the levy rate application to different classes of property. All types of
taxable property must receive identical tax treatment, regardless of
other relevant considerations.25 While there was no definition of the
word "property" in the constitution, it was evident that the drafters
meant that the taxable property, to which the requirement of equal
treatment applied, included not only real property but also all kinds of
personal property, intangible as well as tangible. This was patent both
from the lack of anything to qualify or limit the modifying word "all"
24 WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 8 appears to do no more than elaborate upon this idea.
It states that: "Whenever the expenses of any fiscal year shall exceed the income,
the legislature may provide for levying a tax for the ensuing fiscal year, sufficient,
with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency, as well as the estimated expenses
of the ensuing fiscal year." This section, which is still operative, has not had much
effect in shaping the state's tax structure. It applies only to taxes levied for state
purposes. Mason v. Purdy, 11 Wash. 591, 40 Pac. 139 (1895).
25 The all-inclusive sweep of the equality requirement of the constitution became
evident in a very few years. In 1897 the legislature amended the revenue law to
provide for an exemption of $500 worth of personal property for each individual and
an exemption of $500 worth of improvements on the land of each taxable person.
The court held such exemptions were in conflict with the equality provision. State
ex rel. Chamberlain v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 Pac. 243 (1897). Article VII, § 2,
was amended in 1900 to permit exemption of the personal property of the head of a
household (limited to $300 in value). WASH. CoNsT. amend. 3 (1900).
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and from the proviso, appearing in the latter part of the section, "that
a deduction of debts from credits may be authorized."
The legislature was directed by section 2 to "prescribe such regula-
tion by general law as shall secure a just valuation of all property, so
that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her or its property." While this focuses upon valuation
and procedures for assessment, it further evidences the drafters' con-
cern for equality of treatment for tax purposes, not only with respect to
different types of property owners. The third and fourth sections of
article VII also illustrate how greatly concerned the members of the
constitutional convention were with uniformity and equality. These
sections provide that corporations should not receive any better treat-
ment than individual property owners.26
The remainder of section 2 related to exemptions and provided that,
"property of the United States and of the state, counties, school dis-
tricts and other municipal corporations, and such other property as the
legislature may by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxa-
tion." The properties of the specified governments and subdivisions of
the state were thus constitutionally immunized from taxation. While
the legislature was given no discretion with respect to governmental
property, it appeared to have the authority to exempt such other kinds
of property as it might select and designate by general law. However,
this proved to be an erroneous belief. The Washington Supreme Court,
applying the rule of ejusdem generis, held in State ex rel. Chamberlain
v. Danie2 7 that the legislative power to exempt was limited to property
that was of the same character as the property constitutionally ex-
empted, i.e., public and quasi-public property. This interpretation led
to the 1900 amendment which authorized the legislature to exempt a
limited amount of personal property belonging to the head of a house-
hold.2" Sections 5, 6, and 7 of article VII have had little, if any, effect
upon the content of the taxing system.29
26 WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 3 provided that "the legislature shall provide by
general law for the assessing and levying of taxes on all corporation property as near
as may be by the same methods as are provided for the assessing and levying of taxes
on individual property" and § 4 stated that "the power to tax corporations and
corporate property shall not be surrendered or suspended by any contract or grant to
which the state shall be a party." Both of these sections were deleted by WASH.
CONST. amend. 14 (1930). See text accompanying notes 62-76 infra. The same
thought concerning corporate taxation is also evidenced in art. XII, § 17, which relates
to the rolling stock and other movable property of railroad corporations and states
that such property "shall be liable to taxation... in the same manner as the personal
property of individuals. ... "
27 17 Wash. 111, 49 Pac. 243 (1897). 2 8 WASH. CONST. amend. 3, § 1 (1900).
20 Section 5 requires that taxes be levied only by law and that the tax law state
19651
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Municipal Taxation. Section 9 of article VII and section 12 of
article XI relate to the powers of taxation enjoyed by the municipal
subdivisions of the state. A portion of section 9 and the final clause of
section 12 are, at least in part, overlapping.3" The provisions of both
sections are permissive in character and clearly show that municipal
corporations are without any inherent power of taxation, being depend-
ent upon legislative grant for their enjoyment of such power. The
legislature may give such authority or it may withhold it.3
The latter portion of section 9 states that taxes for municipal pur-
poses "shall be uniform with respect to persons and property with the
jurisdiction of the body levying the same." Unlike the provision in
section 2 of article VII, section 9 requires only that municipally levied
taxes be uniform, not uniform and equal, with respect to the subject
matter to which such tax applies. This permits classification of the
objects upon which municipal taxes may be imposed. It is also to be
noted that this section is phrased in terms broad enough to embrace all
types of taxes, not just property taxes.32
The initial portion of article XI, section 12, frequently called the
"home-rule provision," restricts legislative action by stating that "the
legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities,
towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants of prop-
erty thereof, for county, city, town or other municipal purposes... "
The apparent objective of this restrictive provision (which is followed
by the permissive authority-to-grant-taxing-power-to-municipalities
clause previously discussed) is to bar the legislators, whose members
come from all parts of the state, from dictating to any municipality
that it shall, for its own purposes, levy any particular type of tax or
levy a tax at any particular rate prescribed by the legislature. How-
the object to which it is to be applied. Sections 6 and 7 require payment of state taxes
into the treasury in money only and require publication of an annual statement of
receipts and disbursements of public money.
3 0 WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9 states: "The legislature may vest the corporate
authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by
special assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited. For all corporate
purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect
taxes.... " Art. XI, § 12 states: "The legislature ... may, by general laws, vest in
the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such
[i.e., municipal] purposes."
31 For more detailed discussion of the taxation powers of municipalities under the
constitution, see Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Wah-
ington, 38 WASH. L. Rxv. 743, 749-55 (1963).
82 See also Id. at 755-57 and Harsch & Shipman, The Constitutional Aspects of
Washington'as Fiscal Crisis, 33 WASH. L. REv. 225, 263-64 (1958).
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ever, this constitutional language has been interpreted to impose other
restrictions which are discussed below.83
Early Tax Legislation under the new Constitution. At the incep-
tion of statehood in 1889, the legislature first reenacted the revenue
laws for support of the state, counties, school districts, and for con-
struction and maintenance of roads and bridges, in substantially the
same form as these laws had been immediately prior to statehood. 4 In
addition, the legislature provided for a poll tax to be paid into the
general funds of the counties.85
The new state constitution prohibited the charter of cities and towns
by special act of the legislature, requiring instead the enactment of
general laws for their organization. 8 Consequently, the state legisla-
ture at its first session enacted general laws for the organization of four
classes of cities which were based upon variations in population."' In
conformity with the constitutional provisions of article VII, section 9,
and article XI, section 12, this act also granted specified powers of taxa-
tion to each class of city. As had been true under each of the separate
city charters of the territorial period, cities of each class were granted
authority to levy and collect taxes for municipal purposes upon taxable
property in the municipality." The property subject to tax was the
same as that taxable for state purposes 9 and, as under territorial pro-
cedures, specified officials of the cities were to assess, equalize valua-
tions, and collect the municipal property taxes. In 1893, however,
these functions were shifted to the county assessor, county board of
equalization, and the county treasurer40 This action eliminated the
unneccessary duplication in performance that had existed.
33 See text accompanying notes 61, 62, and 132-39 infra. For further discussion of
the impact of WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 9, see Trautman, supra note 31, at 749-50 and
Harsch & Shipman, supra note 32, at 264-74.
34 Wash. Laws 1889-90, ch. XVIII, "AN ACT to provide for the assessment and
collection of taxes in the State of Washington.' This act became law without the
governor's approval.
35 Wash. Laws 1889-90, at 555, 623 (property highway tax, not to exceed 7 mills).
36 WA sH. CoNsT. art XI, § 10.
37 Wash. Laws 1889-90, ch. VII, § 1, at 131; §§ 23, 24, at 143; § 104, at 178; § 142,
at 198; § 1, at 215.
"
8 Wash. Laws 1889-90, ch. VII, Cities, § 5, at 219, (first-class cities); § 53, at
159 (second-class cities); § 117(9), at 184 (third-class cities) ; § 154(9), at 202 (fourth-
class cities).
SDSee, e.g., the provision relating to second-class cities. Wash. Laws 1889-90, § 53,
at 159.40 Wash. Laws 1893, chs. LXXI and LXXII, at 167, 171, passim. These acts were
also applicable to cities which had been chartered by special act during the territorial
period; see, e.g., Wash. Laws 1893, § 9, at 170.
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Under the general statutes relating to cities the legislature also
vested in the municipalities authority to license certain businesses and
to collect license taxes thereon. These provisions followed the pattern
of territorial city charters, as did the provision for the authority to levy
the poll taxes, dog taxes, and the liquor vendors tax, specifically granted
to cities of the third and fourth classes.4 '
1890-1930: WASHINGTON AS A PROPERTY TAX STATE
During the first forty years of statehood the general pattern of the
taxing system remained fairly constant. At the county, city, town,
school, and other local district level the major reliance continued to be
upon the property tax, with cities and towns deriving a small portion
of their revenue from licensing of certain activities carried on within
the municipal limits. The poll tax, which provided some revenue for
county and road district purposes during the early part of this period,
fell into disfavor and was eliminated. 4' The era of liquor prohibition,
by local option in many areas before the state bone-dry law and the
following federal prohibition amendment, 41 dried up a source of license
revenue which had been traditionally available to the cities and towns.
These factors and others, increasing population, emerging industrializa-
tion, the beginning of an urban living trend, the First World War, the
automobile, technological developments, greater national prosperity,
combined to call for larger governmental expenditures and the placing
of greater burdens upon the property tax payer. The alterations of the
taxing structure which were taking place during this period were made
at the state level. New excise or license taxes were levied and the pro-
ceeds paid into the state treasury for the support of the expanding
activities.
The earliest example of a tax for state purposes, other than an ad
valorem property tax,4 was levied by the first state legislature in
1890. This tax, levied at the rate of two percent, was imposed upon
4 1 Wash. Laws 1889-90, ch. VII, §§ 117(7), (8) and (10), at 184; §§ 154(7),
(8) and (10), at 202-03.
42 The poll tax for county purposes was repealed in 1893 by virtue of its deletion
from the re-enacted Revenue Law. Wash. Laws 1893, ch. CXXIV, at 323. The road
poll tax was specifically repealed by Wash. Laws 1907, ch. 246, § 3, at 680.
43 Init. No. 3 (1914), Wash. Laws 1915, ch. 2, at 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII
(1919).
44 Fees collected by state officers for special services performed by them are not
regarded as taxes. During the territorial period, as well as by laws enacted at the
first session of the state legislature, various state officers were authorized and directed
to collect specified fees for special services performed by them. See, e.g., CODE of
1881, ch. CLIII, § 2086; ch. CCVII, § 2647, and HILL'S CODES 1891, § 75 (secretary
of state), § 131 (state land commissioner), and § 138 (state geologist) (1891).
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the gross premiums received by insurance companies doing business in
the state."5 In 1891 this statute was amended to make this tax in lieu
of "all taxes upon the personal property" of the insurance company
"and the shares of stock therein." ' This 1891 amendment constituted
another "first" in state taxation as it was the forerunner of several
excise taxes levied by the state in lieu of taxes on specified kinds of
personal property.
Another new state-levied tax was added in 1897, the annual license
fee of ten dollars for both domestic and foreign corporations. At the
same time, the fee for filing original and amendatory articles of in-
corporation was fixed at a minimum of ten dollars.Y7 In 1923 the
method of computing this tax was altered to provide for a minimum
filing fee of twenty-five dollars.
The year 1901 saw another tax innovation, a tax upon the transfer
of property from a decedent to his heirs or legatees.4" This is com-
monly known as the classified inheritance tax because different rates of
tax apply depending, first, upon the relationship of the heir or legatee
to the decedent and, second, upon the amount of property received by
the heir or legatee. Immediately, the Washington Supreme Court held
that this was not a tax on property for purposes of the state constitu-
tional provisions relating to taxation, but that it was, instead, an impost
or excise to which the equality requirement of article VII, section 2,
did not apply. Thus it was determined that the constitutional re-
quirement of equality applies only to the property tax and the legisla-
ture has a much greater latitude in selecting the objects upon which it
may impose a tax when the tax is denominated an excise or impost tax
rather than a property tax.
Other excise tax innovations during this period were the motor ve-
hicle license tax,50 the motor vehicle operator's license fee, 1 and the tax
45 Wash. Laws 1889-90, ch. XVIII, § 47, at 547. An ambiguous provision for dis-
tribution of a portion of this tax to the counties was deleted in 1891: Wash. Laws
1891, ch. CXL, § 42, at 295.
4 6 Wash. Laws 1891, at 296. It expressly provided that the real property of such a
company should be assessed and taxed the same as other real property.
47 Wash. Laws 1897, ch. LXX, at 134. Prior to this time there had been only small
service-type fees for the filing of articles, etc., by the Secretary of State.4 8 Wash. Laws 1901, ch. LV, at 67.
49 State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 Pac. 20 (1902).
50 Wash. Laws 1905, ch. 154, at 293, under which the annual fee was $2. Under
Wash. Laws 1921, ch. 96, § 15, at 261, the basic fee for both automobiles and trucks
was $10 with additional charges based on weight of auto and truck and an additional
charge for trucks based on rated cargo capacity of the vehicle.
51 Wash. Laws 1921, ch. 108, §§ 6, 7, at 325-26.
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on gasoline for use in motor vehicles.52 These taxes, engendered by the
booming manufacture of motor vehicles and popular demand for roads,
became, and continue to be, important sources of revenue. But another
legislative experiment in state-wide taxation did not prove popular.
The legislature in 1921 resorted to the well-known poll tax, by impos-
ing an annual tax of five dollars on all persons within the state with
specified exemptions." There was an immediate public response and
the tax was repealed in 1922 by an initiative measure. 4
Creation of the State Tax Commission. The first state agency
charged solely with functions relating to taxation, the State Board of
Tax Commissioners, was established in 1905.11 The governor was di-
rected to appoint three persons as full-time members. Prior to this time
the revenue acts had provided for a state board of equalization with a
membership consisting of elected state officials. This state board of
equalization was responsible for two functions. First, it examined and
compared the assessments of property by the assessors of the several
counties and equalized them so that each county paid a property tax in
proportion to the ratio its property bore to the total value of all state
property. Second, it determined the rate of levy on taxable property
for state purposes57 and advised the county auditors of the adjustment
required in assessing county property in order to conform with the
state board's equalization for state tax purposes.5 " Under the 1905 act,
the members of the State Board of Tax Commissioners also assumed
duties as ex officio members of the state board of equalization.
The new Board was directed to exercise general supervision of the
system of taxation throughout the state. Specifically, it was to supervise
the assessors and county boards of equalization and determine the
assessment of taxable property in each county, city, and town in order
to equalize the tax throughout the different municipalities and counties.
52 Wash. Laws 1921, ch. 173, § 2, at 670 (one cent per gallon) ; Wash. Laws 1923,
ch. 81, § 1, at 242 (two cents per gallon) ; Wash. Laws 1929, ch. 88, at 159, esp. §§ 1,
5, 7 (three cents per gallon with the additional taxes earmarked for distribution
to counties for highway construction and maintenance).
53 Wash. Laws 1921, ch. 174, at 674.5 4 Init. No. 40 (1922), Wash. Laws 1923, ch. 1, at 1 (the vote was by a 3-1 margin).
55 Wash. Laws 1905, ch. 115, at 224.
56 From beginning of statehood until establishment of the State Board of Tax
Commissioners, the secretary of state, the state land commissioner, and the state
auditor were ex officio members of the state board of equalization. Wash. Laws
1889-90, § 75, at 557; see also Wash. Laws 1897, ch. LXXI, § 60, at 164.
57 Wash. Laws 1891, ch. CXL, § 73, at 308; compare Wash. Laws 1897, ch. LXXI,
§ 62, at 166.
58 Wash. Laws 1891, ch. CXL, § 72; compare Wash. Laws 1897, ch. LXXI, §§ 60,
61, at 165-66.
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The Board was also directed to confer with, advise, and direct asses-
sors as to their duties including an examination of their work. If the
assessor failed to correct an omission or inaccuracy, the Board was to
bring the matter before the county board of equalization.59 After sev-
eral changes in its organizational structure, this agency became a three-
man body known as the Tax Commission."
However, when the legislature authorized the Tax Commission
(upon appropriate occasion and after notice and hearing) to redeter-
mine the value of property and direct the county assessor to extend
such redetermined valuation upon the county tax rolls, the Washington
court held that the state constitution forbade the exercise of such
power with respect to taxes imposed for county, city and other local
purposes.6 As a consequense of this decision, and others in the same
vein which followed, it became, and continues to be, impossible for the
state or its officials to require the county assessors to strictly adhere to
the statutory, and now the constitutional, mandate that taxable prop-
erty be assessed at fifty percent of its value.62 Some of the problems
which still persist as the result of this lack of power in state tax officials
will be discussed below.
6
Tax Exemptions for Personal Property-Constitutional Problem.
Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate that all property be
taxed uniformly and equally64 the taxing authorities found it virtually
impossible to enforce the provision which required that the taxation of
intangible personal property be on the same basis as real and tangible
personal property. 5 So, in 1907, the legislature amended the tax law
to provide that money plus a number of specified types of intangible
personal property should no longer be subject to the property tax."s
59 Wash. Laws 1905, ch. 115, § 2, at 225, and § 3, at 227.60 Wash. Laws 1925, ch. 18, § 1, at 33.6 1 State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932).
The action of the Tax Commission was taken pursuant to the provisions of a re-
assessment and re-taxation act passed in 1931 (Wash. Laws 1931, ch. 106, at 306)
which permitted the Commission to act only with respect to excessive assessments or
assessments which were void in whole or in part, § 2, at 307-08. The court concluded
that WASH. CowsT. art. XII, § 12, forbade the exercise of this power by the state
or its agency.62 For a more extensive discussion of the constitutional problems concerning assess-
ment see Harsch & Shipman, supra note 32, at 269-74.63 See text accompanying notes 132-39 infra.
6 4 WASH. CoNsT. art VII, § 2 (1889).
65 In 1893 the legislature had amended the property tax law to specifically provide
for assessment, at "true and actual value," of all credits except mortgages and "credits
for purchase of real estate." Wash. Laws 1893, ch. 74, § 3, at 324.66 Wash. Laws 1907, ch. 48, § 1, at 49. "Mortgages, notes, accounts, moneys, cer-
tificates of deposit, tax certificates, judgments, state, county, municipal and school
district bonds and warrants should not be considered as property for the purpose of
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The constitutional validity of this legislative exemption was im-
mediately challenged. While the supreme court stated that the con-
stitutional mandate for taxation of "all property" was met "without the
taxation of credits" and thus upheld the legislative exemption of the
specified types of intangibles, it held the exemption of money, a tang-
ible property, invalid.67 Thereafter, it appears that for all practical
purposes, no effort was made to tax any type of intangible property,
and many kinds of tangible personal property were overlooked when
the lists of taxable property were prepared.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The complaints of owners of real property and those owners of
personal property which did not escape listing on the tax rolls grew
more and more audible during the "twenties". These complaints were
against both the obvious unevenness in the distribution of the property
tax load among property owners and the high rates of tax levy in many
parts of the state. The first of a long series of initiative measures pro-
viding, inter alia, for a maximum tax levy of forty mills on any prop-
erty, on the basis of assessment at fifty percent of its value, was
submitted to the voters of the state in 1924,6s but this failed to pass.
Amendment Fourteen Fundamentally Alters the Tax Structure.
At its 1929 session the legislature proposed an amendment to article VII
of the state constitution. This was approved by the voters in 19309 and
effected a repeal of the first four sections of article VII, by substituting
a completely new section. One of the major changes was to permit
the classification of personal property for the purpose of taxation.
Instead of requiring that assessment and levy of all property be uniform
and equal, the amendment requires that "all taxes be uniform upon the
same class of property." Standing alone this would have permitted
classification of all types of property, but there is an important qual-
ification. This is the requirement that "all real estate shall constitute
one class.. ." with the exception that mines, mineral resources, and
lands devoted to reforestation may be treated separately and made
subject to a yield tax or an ad valorem tax. Thus, the overall effect of
this amendment permits the legislature to exercise its discretion in
classifying personal property but bars the creation of different classes
this chapter, and no deduction shall hereafter be allowed on account of indebtedness
owed." Ibid.
67 State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 Pac. 1047 (1907).
6s Init. No. 50.69 WASH. CONST. amend. 14 (1930).
[VOL. 39
WASHINGTON TAX STRUCTURE
of real estate except in the case of mining property and reforestation
land.
Another significant change of amendment fourteen is with respect to
the exemption of property from taxation. Unlike the original language
of article VII which had been construed to vest quite limited discretion
regarding exemptions in the legislature," the amendment gives the
legislature complete discretion to determine what kinds of property,
real as well as personal, shall be exempted.' This is in addition to the
several types of public properties which the constitutional provision
itself prescribes shall be exempt."2
The new constitutional provision also decreed an exemption for
"credits secured by property actually taxed in this state, not exceeding
in value the value of such property." Notwithstanding its power to
classify personal property for purposes of taxation, this constitutional
mandate for an exemption of certain credits seems to effectively bar
the legislature from taxing any intangible property under any plan
which would be administratively feasible and legally valid. However,
there has never been any necessity for a determination of this issue
since the legislature immediately enacted the presently operative pro-
vision that all money and credits shall be exempt from taxation. 4
A completely new provision in amendment fourteen was a sentence
which provides that: "the word 'property' as used herein shall mean
and include everything, whether tangible or intangible, 5 subject to
ownership." While on its face this appears to convey no more than the
term "all property" which appeared in the pre-1930 constitutional pro-
visions, this sentence has had an enormous impact upon the shaping of
the tax structure of this state.7
70 See text accompanying note 67 upra. See also Pacific Cold Storage Co. v.
Pierce County, 85 Wash. 626, 149 Pac. 34 (1915).71 State ex rel Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P2d 653 (1931). See also
Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. Benton County, 179 Wash. 1, 35 P.2d 1109 (1934). How
the legislature has exercised its power to exempt under this constitutional provision
is shown in RCW, ch. 84.36.
72 "Property of the United States and of the state, counties, school districts, and
other municipal corporations.., shall be exempt from taxation." WASH. CoNsT. amend.
14. With respect to the United States this is modified by WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 3,
amend. 19, to permit taxation to the full extent permitted by the laws of the United
States.
73 For an elaboration of the reasons supporting this statement, see Harsch & Ship-
man, supra note 62, at 249-51.
74 RCW 84.36.070. The constitutional validity of this exemption statute was upheld
in State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P2d 653 (1931).
76 By requiring, in a following sentence, mandatory exemption of "credits secured
by property actually taxed," the mention of intangibles here as little, if any, effect.
See text accompanying note 73 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 115-18 infra.
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THE SHIFT FROM PROPERTY TAX TO EXCISE TAX
Adoption of amendment fourteen, however, did not insure that prop-
erty owners would obtain the relief they desired from high property
taxes. There existed an increasing belief that other sources of revenue
should be utilized to meet the rising costs of both state and local gov-
ernment units, costs which were unquestionably due to the popular
demand for more and better highways, more and better schools, in-
creased health and sanitation facilities, and more parks, playgrounds,
and recreational facilities. In addition, the nationwide economic de-
pression which followed the break in the business boom of the middle
and late 1920's added businessmen and farmers as well as home-
owners to the property owners who demanded relief from the unrea-
sonable and inequitable burden which they felt the existing tax struc-
ture placed upon them.
In the spring of 1932, five initiative petitions relating to taxation
were filed. Of the five, two proposed exemption of residential property
from taxation77 and one sought repeal of the butter substitutes excise
tax."8 However, while none of these reached the ballot, the other two
proposals were more successful.
The Forty Mill Limitation. Initiative Measure No. 64"M proposed
that, with stated exceptions, the aggregate tax levy upon any taxable
property in the state could not exceed forty mills, based upon an
assessed valuation of fifty percent of the true and fair value of such
property. In addition to providing this over-all limitation, the measure
established specific millage limitations for the state and its three major
subdivisions."0 This measure also provided that if certain stated pro-
cedures were complied with, a county, school district, city, or town
could levy a tax in excess of the rate specified when it was approved by
sixty per cent of the persons voting at a special election.
During the months which followed approval of the so-called "forty
mill measure," there were many proposals for its revision. Some people
suggested that its provisions be made more stringent while others urged
77 Init. No. 59 and Init No. 63.
78 Init. No. 67. This tax had produced no revenue.
7 9 Wash. Laws 1933, ch. 4, at 47; adopted November 1932. The text of this measure
was identical to that of Init. No. 50, which had failed in the 1924 election. See text
accompanying note 68 supra.
80 The specific rate limitations were as follows: state, 5 mills; county, 10 mills;
school district, 10 mills; city or town, 15 mills. Taxing districts (other than school
districts) comprising an area less than a county were excluded from the overall
limitation in this measure.
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that it should be made less stringent in various respects or repealed
entirely. Because of this controversy, the sponsors of the limitation
measure decided not to leave its revision to the 1934 legislature.8" So in
1934, another initiative measure was filed which re-enacted the aggre-
gate and specific levy limitations and made some changes which the
sponsors had reason to believe would make the limitation measure more
effective. This measure was approved by the voters at the general
election of 1934.82 The same procedure was followed in 19368" and
1938.84 In 1939 and 1941 a different procedure was followed. The
"forty-mill measure" was enacted by the legislature and then referred
to a vote of the people at the general elections of 1940 and 1942. Each
time the voters approved. 5
Following these six successive, and successful, biennial submissions
of the "forty-mill" limitation measure to the voters, the 1943 legisla-
ture proposed, and the electorate accepted, a constitutional amendment
which incorporated the overall levy limitation of forty mills.86 This is
applicable to levies by the state and all taxing districts87 except for port
or public utility districts. Under this constitutional provision the leg-
islature is permitted the determination of how the total forty mills is to
be divided among the state and the several taxing districts.
The amendment also sets up exclusive methods and procedures
through which any taxing district may authorize a levy in excess of its
statutory millage limitation. Thus an excess levy requires approval by
sixty per cent of the votes cast, and forty per cent of the voters who
cast ballots in the preceding general election must vote upon the
proposal. Further, authorization of an excess levy to finance cur-
rent operations can not be operative for more than one year. This
latter provision requires a separate submission and vote for each year
that an additional tax levy for current operations is needed.88 Finally,
81 WAsH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c), amend. 7 (1912), provided that an initiative
measure approved by the voters could not be amended or repealed by the legislature
within a period of two years after its enactment. (This rule was operative until
adoption of Amendment 26 in 1952). After the two-year period, the legislature had
the power to amend or repeal such an act.
82 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 2, Init. No. 94. The vote was 219,635 to 192,168.83 Wash. Laws 1937, ch. 1, Init. No. 114. The vote was 417,641 to 120,478.84 Wash.Laws 1939, ch. 2, at 5, Init No. 129. The vote was 340,296 to 149,534.
85 Wash. Laws 1939, ch. 83, at 217; Referendum No. 5 (1940). The vote was
390,639 to 149,843. Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 176, at 474; Referendum No. 6 (1942).
This time the vote was 252,431 to 75,540.8 6 WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 2, amend. 17 (1944).87 Defined to "mean any political subdivision, municipal corporation, district, or
other governmental agency authorized by law to levy or have levied for it, ad valorem
taxes on property...." Ibid.88 There also are detailed conditions relating to tax levies in excess of the stated
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a proposal cannot be submitted to the voters more than twice in any
one calendar year.
Net Income Tax. On the ballot at the general election in the fall of
1932, along with the first of the "forty-mill" measures, was an initiative
which proposed a tax at graduated rates upon the net income of natural
persons and corporations. This net income tax proposal was sponsored
by, or had the blessing of, a number of organizations and associations
who were advocating a broader state tax base. These organizations
recognized the need for additional state tax revenue in order to cover
the anticipated reduction in property tax revenues resulting from ap-
proval of the forty-mill limitation measure. While not a "package
deal," the two measures were generally regarded as companion meas-
ures and both were approved by the voters, with the income tax
receiving a margin of approval substantially greater than the tax
limitation measure.89
Business and Occupation Tax. By the fall of 1932 the economic
depression had spread throughout the nation. Tax collections had
spiraled downward and property owners were demanding either com-
plete forgiveness or virtually indefinite postponement, without penalty,
of taxes already due or to become due. In addition, governmental
treasuries were being drained by the expenditures necessary to main-
tain the breadlines and other minimal forms of assistance to the
constantly-increasing groups of unemployed and needy citizens. The
economic debacle reached its climax with the bank holiday in March
1933 while the Washington Legislature was in session.
With demands rising, collections from existing property and other
taxes falling, and doubts rising as to the amount of revenue which
would be derived from the net income tax during the depression
maximum levies for payment of interest and principal on bonded indebtedness. A levy
in excess of the specific maximum for the taxing district which is to be made in two
or more consecutive years can be authorized by the voters of the taxing district only
if the proceeds of such levies are to be used to pay interest and principal of a bonded
indebtedness incurred solely for the purpose of making capital improvements other
than replacement of equipment. In such case the proposal to incur general obligation
indebtedness, issue bonds, and to pay the interest and principal thereon from the
proceeds of the tax levy must be submitted to a vote of the electors in the district. Not
less than forty per cent of the persons who voted at the last general election must cast
votes on the proposition: and at least sixty per cent of the persons voting on the
proposition must vote in favor of the proposal. Ibid.
89 Wash. Laws 1933, ch. 5, at 49; Init. No. 69 (net income tax). The vote
was: For 322,919; Against 136,983. Its plurality was over 73,000 greater than that
of Init. No. 64, the forty-mill tax limitation measure approved at the same election.
Wash. Laws 1933, ch. 4, at 47.
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period,"0 the legislature levied another new tax.9 This tax was imposed
on individuals, partnerships, and corporations engaging in production,
manufacturing, selling, public utility, transportation, banking, amuse-
ment, and other specified types of businesses conducted within the
state. Since the amount of tax was determined by applying varying
rates to the gross receipts derived by the several classes of taxpayers,
the new tax was a classified tax, the measure of which was gross re-
ceipts or gross income, with different rates applicable to different
classes of taxpayers.
Constitutional Problem. The validity of both the 1932 net income
tax and the 1933 business and occupation tax was challenged on the
ground that each conflicted with the state constitutional provisions of
article VII, section 1 as amended in 1930. The Washington Supreme
court, in Culliton v. Chase,92 held that net income constitutes property
as that word is defined in section 1." As a tax on property, the tax on
net income is subject to the uniformity and restricted classification
provisions of article VII, section 1. Therefore, the net income tax
was invalid because it improperly created two classes of real estate,
namely income-producing land and unproductive land.94
On the same day that Culliton was decided, the Washington court
sustained the validity of the business and occupation tax. This tax,
which operates on different classes of persons and applies varying
rates to gross receipts, was declared an excise tax to which the provi-
sions of amendment fourteen did not apply.95 Thus, the legislature
was held to have the power of creating classes of taxpayers upon the
basis of business activities performed and, as to the classes created,
could impose a tax at different rates upon differing types of gross
receipts.
90 The allowance of credits for property taxes paid against the computed amount
of net income tax payable also created doubt with respect to the amount of revenue
which this new income tax law would produce.
01 Wash. Laws 1933, ch. 191, at 869.
92 174 Wash. 363, 25 P2d 81 (1933).
03 "The word 'property' as used herein shall mean and include everything, whether
tangible or intangible, subject to ownership." WAsH. Co NsT. art 7, § 1, amend. 14
(1930).
94 The court also held that the income tax law violated the uniformity clause because
it applied graduated rates upon income, all of which constitutes a single class. The
decision was 5 to 4. See Harsch & Shipman, The Constitutional Aspect of Wash-
ington's Fiscal Crisis, 33 WASH. L. R-v. 225, 252-56, 279-82 (1958), and Comment,
A Study of State Income Taxation in Washington, 33 WAsHr. L. REv. 398 (1958).
O, State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P2d 91 (1933). The decision
was also 5 to 4. The dissenting justices (all of whom had voted against the validity
of the net income tax) felt that the business and occupation tax was also a property
tax, and thus, invalid.
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Following these two decisions the state found itself in the position of
having to rely solely upon the business and occupation tax as the source
of the "new revenue" so desperately needed at that time. This tax was
amended, effective in mid-1934, to make it applicable to services and
other businesses not included under the 1933 act,9" and at its next reg-
ular session the legislature launched a two-pronged attack on the
problem of providing additional sources of revenue for state purposes.
The Revenue Act of 1935-Excise Taxes. Relying upon the court's
holding that a tax based upon an activity performed by the taxpayer,
measured by gross receipts, is not subject to the classification restric-
tions of the constitution, the legislature in the "omnibus" Revenue Act
of 1935" levied a variety of taxes. Each of these was framed to apply
upon the performance of some business or other activity, and in all but
one the amount of the tax was determined by reference to some gross
measure. The 1933 business and occupation tax was re-enacted with
some revisions.9"
The first completely new tax in the Revenue Act, and by far the most
important from the standpoint of revenue produced over the interven-
ing years, was the retail sales tax. This was imposed at the rate of two
per cent of the selling price upon sales of tangible personal property at
retail.99 Also enacted was a compensating, or use, tax.' 0 The latter is
complimentary to the retail sales tax and is imposed only upon a person
who uses, in this state, tangible personal property upon which he did
not pay the Washington retail sales tax when he acquired the article.
The amount of the use tax was two per cent of the article's value, which
generally meant two per cent of the purchase price paid for the article
by the user.
Next in order came the public utility tax which was a re-enactment,
with some revisions, of the 1933 business and occupation tax law.''
Following this was a tax, at rates varying from approximately five per
96Wash. Laws 1933 Ex. Sess. ch. 57, at 157. This tax on services and other
businesses had been vetoed by the governor in 1933.
97 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, at 706. This comprehensive tax act contained twenty
titles, levied sixteen different taxes (of which thirteen had never before been levied
in this state). Of the sixteen, nine are still levied for state purposes and one has
been made available for use by the counties and municipalities.
98 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. II, at 709.
99 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. III, at 71. Sales at retail of certain food items
for consumption off the premises were exempted under this act; § 19(g), at 723. This
exemption was later repealed.
100 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. IV, at 726.
101 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. V, at 728.
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cent to fifty per cent, upon amounts charged for admission to theaters
and places of amusement and entertainment 0 2
Other new state-levied taxes imposed under the provisions of the
1935 omnibus tax measure were: a tax on sales by the state's liquor
control board of intoxicating liquor,03 a stamp tax upon conveyance of
interests in land,1°4 a tax upon fuel and diesel ol,105 and the first of a
series of increasing tax levies on cigarettes.0
The Revenue Act established a new method of computing the amount
of inheritance tax'07 and contained five new kinds of sales or other
excise taxes which did not become operative because they were either
vetoed by the governor0 8 or held invalid under the federal interstate
commerce clause. 09
Revenue Act of 1935-Income Taxes. The second avenue of ap-
proach to the solution of the state's revenue problem was an attempt to
establish the net income tax as a valid component of the state's taxing
structure. The first step had been taken in 1934 when the legislature
submitted a proposal to the voters which would amend the taxation
article of the constitution to specifically provide, inter alia, that a grad-
uated net income tax was not prohibited." 0 Although the voters re-
jected this proposed amendment, the legislature' still included in the
2
0 2 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. VI, at 733. Changes with respect to this tax are
discussed at note 141 infra.
103 Wash. Laws 1935, cl. 180, tit. VII, at 737 (10% of sale price).
104 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. VIII, at 738 (Y10 of 1%).
105 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. XI, at 749 (Y of 1 cent per gallon).
108 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. XII, at 751. The tax imposed was one cent per
pack unless the selling price exceeded 20 cents per pack (very few at that time) then
the tax was 10% of the intended retail selling price.
107 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. XV, at 768. The provision revising the method
of computing the tax (§ 106) and fifteen other sections (§§ 104, 107, 108, 111-15,121-27) designed to improve and strengthen administration of this tax were approved
by the governor, but the governor vetoed eight sections amending other parts of the
inheritance tax statute (§§ 105, 109, 110, 1120).
iosThe governor vetoed a stamp tax (Mo of 1%) on stock issues and transfers;
a stamp tax (10% of intended selling price) on proprietary medicines and toilet
preparations; a chain store tax (progressive rates, varying from $25 to $250 per
store per year); and a tax on lifetime gifts of property (at rates equal to 90%of the rates under the state inheritance tax)
100A tax on the business of radio broadcasting (/ of 1% of gross income);
Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, tit. X, at 748. The tax was held to constitute an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. KVL, Inc. v. Tax Com'n 12 F. Supp. 497
(W.D. Wash. 1935).
110 Wash. Laws 1933, Ex. Sess., HJ.R. No. 12, at 230.
"'I Most legislators believed that, as the voters had so overwhelmingly approved
the net income tax initiative measure in 1932, their rejection of the 1934 proposal
to amend the constitution was due to lack of information as to its purpose and need.
There was nothing, either pro or con, in the SEcEErTAY OF STATE, VOTERS' PAmPHLET(1934) relating to this amendment and none of the state-wide organizations which had
been active in supporting the 1932 initiative income tax measure came out strongly for
the 1934 amendment.
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Revenue Act of 1935 a tax on corporations for the privilege of exercis-
ing their corporate franchises. This tax was levied on the net income
of every corporation doing business in the state" 2 as well as upon the
net income of national banks"' and was imposed at the flat rate of
four per cent.
The legislature also levied a tax on each resident of the state "for the
privilege of receiving income therein while enjoying the protection of
its laws."" This included a normal tax, at the rate of three per cent,
and a surtax, at the rate of four per cent," 5 on an individual's net
income.
Believing that the voters would approve the necessary constitutional
changes if adequately informed, the 1935 legislature submitted a pro-
posal for constitutional revision which would have opened the way for
working out in the legislative arena a number of the serious fiscal
problems then, and still, confronting this state. The proposal was a
comprehensive one, involving provisions relating to the property tax
and its administration as well as the matter of net income taxation.
The resolution submitted to the voters not only proposed amendment
of the court created restrictions in article VII, section 1 but also
amendment of the ninth section of article VII, relating to the taxation
powers of local subdivisions of the state." 6
However, the legislature's net income tax productions were again
rejected. First, by a five to four margin the Washington Supreme
Court held that the 1935 "privilege tax" on individuals, which was
112 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, fit. XVIII, at 811.
"13 An earlier effort (Wash. Laws 1929, ch. 151, at 380) to impose a tax on the
net income of national banks and competing financial institutions had been held
invalid by the Washington court. Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157 Wash.
351, 89 Pac. 536 (1930) (violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution).
114 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 178, § 2, at 661-62. The theory of imposing the tax on
individual taxpayers as a privilege tax was chosen and carefully phrased in hope
that, for the purposes of WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1, amend. 14 (1930), the court
would classify this tax as an excise (as it had the business and occupation tax)
rather than a tax on "property" (as it had the 1932 net income tax). See text accom-
panying notes 94 and 95 supra.
"15 If the court held the surtax invalid, it was thought that the general severability
clause would permit the flat rate of three per cent to be applied.
116 Wash. Laws 1935, S.J.R. No. 7, at 925. This joint resolution proposed to
amend § 1 in the same manner as had been proposed in 1934. See text accompanying
note 111 supra. It also proposed to revise § 9, art. VII, by incorporating in it all
of the non-duplicative language from art. XI, § 12 (which would be repealed) and
add to this section language which would permit the legislature to impose restrictions
relating to assessment and collection when it granted to the municipal subdivisions
of the state power to levy taxes for local purposes. Again the SECRETARY OF STATE,
VOTERS' PAMPHLET 75 (1936) contained nothing but the bare text of the proposed
amendment. The Constitutional Government Committee of Seattle (members unidenti-
fied) circulated a pamphlet opposing adoption of the proposed amendment.
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measured by net income, was a tax on property under the state consti-
tution, and as such it was an invalid classification of property, i.e., net
income, whether levied at grduated rates or at a single, flat rate. 17
Next, in a six to three decision, the court held the flat rate corporate
franchise tax, which was also measured by net income, an invalid
property tax under the provisions of the state constitution."'8 Finally,
the voters rejected, by a decisive margin, the legislature's 1935 pro-
posal for a comprehensive revision of the three sections of the state
constitution relating to taxation."1
Daunted, but still trying to find a partial way out of the maze of
restrictive constitutional provisions and judicial interpretations in
which it was enmeshed, the 1937 legislature put forth one more effort.
This time its proposal for constitutional amendment was very simple.
It offered no revision of existing language, just the addition of a single
sentence stating that the constitution does not prohibit the levy of a
graduated net income tax. 20 But once more the voters rejected a pro-
posal for constitutional revision which would have permitted greater
flexibility in framing the state's tax system while, at the same time,
approving the initiative measure re-enacting the restrictive forty-mill
property tax limitation law.
As the end of the 1930's approached, it seemed evident that while
the voters would not approve any suggestion for removal of constitu-
tional restrictions on the legislature's powers with respect to taxation,
they would readily approve the establishment, and continuation, of
measures which further restricted legislative discretion with respect to
the revenue laws and their administration. Notwithstanding this ap-
parent attitude on the part of the voters, the 1941 legislature hopefully
tried once more to obtain voter approval of a constitutional provision
which would validate a graduated net income tax. 21 But again the
117 Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936). The court held there
was an invalid classification under the alternate flat rate tax because the exemption
for a married taxpayer was greater than that for a single taxpayer. See authorities
cited note 94 supra.
118 Petroleum Nay. Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 495, 55 P2d 1056 (1936). This
holding stands alone in the United States in classifying a corporate franchise tax
as a tax on property.119 See note 116 supra. The vote was 93,598 to 328,675.
120 Wash. Laws 1937, SJ.R. No. 5, at 1231. Again no one was sufficiently inter-
ested to provide an explanation of the objectives of the proposed amendment. See
SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS' PAMPHLET 14 (1938). The Washington State Farm
Bureau, Washington Association of Real Estate Boards, and the Washington State
Taxpayers Association endorsed an argument in this pamphlet favoring INrr.
No. 129 which proposed re-enactment of the "40-mill" tax limitation law; Id. at 8.
121 Like the proposal rejected in 1938, the 1941 proposal would have added only a
single sentence to WAsH. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1, amend. 14. The wording of the 1941
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the verdict; no proposal for an income tax amendment has been sub-
mitted to the voters in the last twenty-three years.
Other Constitutional Amendments. Since 1942 there have been,
however, six proposals to amend the constitution on other features re-
lating to taxation.'22 In 1944 the voters approved two constitutional
amendments relating to taxation proposed by the 1943 legislature. The
first of these, incorporating the forty-mill property tax levy limitation
in the constitution, has been previously discussed 22 while the second
requires that motor vehicle license fees, motor vehicle fuel taxes, and
"all other state revenue intended to be used for highway purposes" be
placed in a special state treasury fund and used solely for highway
purposes.' This constitutes a constitutional earmarking of the entire
proceeds of the designated taxes'25 for highway purposes, as defined in
the constitutional provision, and thus further limits legislative discre-
tion in the utilization of available revenue sources.
The third amendment submitted and approved by the voters2 de-
parts from the usual restrictive pattern and permits taxation of the
"United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, and their prop-
erty" to the full extent allowed under the laws of the United States.' 7
The other three proposals for constitutional amendment would have
relaxed the restrictions under the "forty-mill" tax limitation section.'28
These amendments would have permitted the voters at a single election
to approve 9 successive annual levies over a period of not more than
four years.. when such levies are in excess of the stated maximum rate
proposal differed however. It started with the statement: "for the purposes of taxa-
tion income shall not be construed as property..." and made specific reference not
only to the feature of graduation in rates, but also to exemptions, offsets, and de-
ductions.
122 These six do not include two closely related proposals to amend the debt limit
provisions applicable to school districts, to permit additional debt for capital outlays
only. Wash. Laws 1949, H.J.R. No. 10, at 1004; Wash. Laws 1951, H.J.R. No. 8,
at 961.
123 See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
'
2 4 WAsH. CONsT. art. II, § 40, amend. 18.
125 Vehicle operator's license fees, excise taxes imposed on motor vehicles or the
use thereof in lieu of property tax, and fees for certificates of ownership of motor
vehicles are expressly excluded, as are general or special taxes not levied primarily
for highway purposes. Ibid.
128 Wash. Const. art VII, § 3, amend. 19 (1946).
127 The effect is to repeal that part of art. VII, § 1, amend. 14, which constitu-
tionally exempted property of the United States from taxation.28 WAsH. CONST. art. VII, § 2, amend. 17 (1944). See note 86 supra.
129 No change was proposed in the requirement that 60% of the voters (who must
number at least 40% of those who voted at the last general election) vote favorably
on the proposal in order to approve it.
130 The first of the three proposals, which applied only to school districts, would
have permitted levies in two successive years only for current operations and levies
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applicable to the taxing district, and the purpose of such levies was for
the expense of operations or capital improvements without incurring
bonded indebtedness.13' Running true to form, the voters rejected all
three proposals for the relaxation of existing restrictions, even though
the powers could be exercised only by the voters themselves.
DIFFIcuI~ns AT THE LocAL LEVEL
When considering the fiscal situation of the counties, school dis-
tricts, cities, towns and other local subdivisions (except port and public
utility district), it is found that as of 1940, the picture was dismal. The
chief source of revenue of all local subdivisions, and the sole source of
many of them, was the property tax. The forty-mill levy limitation act
with its specific rate limitations applicable to each of the major types of
taxing units had cut deeply into their revenue. This, of course, was the
intent, and the expected result, of the tax limitation measure.
To provide more revenue for the local units of government there
were at least two rather obvious routes to follow. One would be to
soften the impact of the forty-mill limitation act, and thus increase the
amount of local revenue to be derived from the property tax. The other
would be to provide additional non-property tax sources of revenue.
Let us consider the alternatives in this order.
The desire for Equality of Assessment. The fact that the electors
had voted each two years since 1932 to re-enact the forty-mill tax
limitation act and, in 1944, incorporated this limitation in the constitu-
tion, eliminated any hope that the overall limitation could be raised.
However, it had long been recognized that the impact of the tax limita-
tions upon local government finances was greatly magnified by the
practice of the locally-elected county assessors to consistently assess
taxable property at less than the fifty percent of its true and fair value
as required by statute prior to 1944 and by the constitutional provision
thereafter.
In State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Redd,"3 2 decided in 1932, the
voters rejected such a proposal. At this point the legislature accepted
court had held invalid a statute which would have permitted the Tax
Commission, for the purpose of determining taxes for local purposes,
in six successive years for capital outlays. Wash. Laws 1957, Sub. H.J.R. No. 4,
at 1302.2112 Wash. Laws 1961, S.J.R. No. 1, at 2749; applied to school districts and pro-
vided for both types of expenditures. 2 Wash. Laws 1961, HJ.R. No. 1, at 2755;
applied to cities and towns and made provision for capital outlays only.
132 166 Wash. 132, 6 P2d 619 (1932). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
1965]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to revise the county assessor's assessed value of property even though
such valuations were shown to vary substantially from the statutory
standard. In an effort to develop more effective controls over the level
of assessments for local taxation, the legislature proposed an amend-
ment of the constitutional provisions upon which the decision in the
Redd case had depended. The voters, however, rejected these pro-
posals."' 3
In the following years, efforts to persuade the county assessors to
bring the level of their assessments up to the constitutional standard
were ineffective. Then, after study of the problem, an act was passed
in 1955 which directed that school district tax levies be applied to
assessed values of the county assessors as equalized by the state board
of equalization. 4 This legislation would have increased the tax base of
the school districts because the methods employed by the state board of
equalization would have brought the equalized valuations considerably
closer to the fifty percent standard. However, the Washington Supreme
Court in Clark v. Seiber,i'3 divided three ways, held the 1955 statute
invalid.
At its 1955 session the legislature also put forth another effort to
entice county assessors to conform with the constitutional mandate.
This action.. 6 called for a continuing program of revaluation of prop-
erty by the county assessors and they were directed to value property
at fifty percent of true value and in accordance with the rules, regula-
tions, and manuals published by the tax commission. The commission
was authorized to render special assistance to county assessors when-
ever such was requested. In this 1955 act the legislature recognized
that the Tax Commission could do no more than advise and assist the
assessor who is willing to accept such aid.
Present Policies to Achieve Equality of Assessment. The state is
now attempting to bring some pressure to bear upon each of the coun-
ties, and their respective assessors, to meet the constitutional standard
of assessment. This is being done by requiring the State Board of
Equalization to gradually lower its "fixed ratios" of assessment and,
thus, over a period of years to make the "fixed ratio" for each county
133 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
134 Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 253, at 1035. Earlier, the court had ruled that a school
district could not voluntarily use the higher equalized value for this purpose. State
ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 638 (1934).
135 48 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956).
136 Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 251, at 1027.
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conform with the "actual ratio," now designated "indicated ratio," of
property assessment for each county.'" As the State Board uses the
"fixed ratio" to determine the dollar amount of assessed value of inter-
county operating properties of utilities (assessed by the state tax com-
mission), to be allocated to each county, the lowering of this ratio
operates to reduce the total property tax base available to the county
and to the taxing districts in the county.38 If the actual ratio of assess-
ment by the county assessor goes up, the downward movement of the
State Board's "fixed ratio" will be halted. Whether this method of
"persuasion" will be effective still remains to be determined. It should
be noted that after ten years of gradual reduction in the "fixed ratio"
the range of the Tax Commission's "indicated ratios" of assessment for
the year 1963 was from 14.6 percent in San Juan County to 25 percent
in Grant County. This does not show much alteration in the actual
ratio of assessment from what it was in 1954.139
Other Sources of Local Revenue. As preivously mentioned, another
approach to the problem of local finance would be to authorize the
various subdivisions to levy and collect taxes of various kinds other
than property tax. The consensus of legislators and experienced tax
administrators has been that the local administration of most types of
excise taxes is costly and inconvenient. Consequently, the state has
pre-empted for state levy such taxes as the retail sales tax, use tax, tax
on conveyances, and the cigarette tax 0
In two instances the legislature has authorized local levy and collec-
tion of taxes which had not been previously available at the local level.
In 1943 the state-levied tax on admissions was repealed, and the coun-
137 Over a long period of years it has been the practice of the State Board of
Equalization to establish its "fixed ratio" for each county at a figure which is sub-
stantially higher than the "actual ratio" of assessment in the county as determined
by the State Tax Commission. STATE OF WASHINGTON, 17TH BIEN AL REP'T and
1958 ANN. REV'T OF THE TAx CommnssIoN 24-25 (1958).
138 For an excellent description of the property tax process in Washington see
WASHINGTON STATE RESEARCE CouNc, HANDBOOK-STATE AND LocAL GovERN-
BlENT IN WASHINGTON 568-79 (1964-65 ed.). Tables showing the "fixed ratios" and
"indicated ratios" of property tax assessments in the thirty-nine counties of the state
over the ten-year period 1954-63 are found at 584-85. For a description of the manner
in which the "fixed ratio" is used for purposes of the state tax levy see 574, and for
its use in allocating to the several counties the value of utility properties assessed
by the Tax Commission see 572.
189 Over the ten-year period 1954-63 the number of counties having an "indicated
ratio" of 20% or more increased sixteen to twenty-one. However, in eleven counties
the 1963 "indicated ratio" was lower than the 1954 ratio for the same county and in
one county there was no change in ratio for the two years. These comparisons indicate
that persuasion, even when coupled with some economic pressure, is not very effective.14o RCW 82.02.020.
19651
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ties and cities were authorized to levy such a tax.'" ' Later the legisla-
ture authorized counties to levy a tax on real estate sales for the benefit
of school districts in the county."4 2 In order to avoid duplication in this
latter tax, the state has not levied its own tax on real estate sales.
A number of cities in the state, following the lead of Seattle in 1943,
impose a tax for city purposes on persons and corporations engaging in
certain businesses and occupations which is measured by gross receipts
or gross income. These city taxes are patterned after the state-levied
business and occupation tax but are imposed at a much lower rate. The
state has not pre-empted this method of taxation. Thus, the cities have
been able to impose this duplicative tax under their general grant of
power to license for revenue purposes.
In addition to authorizing or permitting these additional taxes, the
state has followed the patterns of assisting the counties, cities, and
school districts by sharing the proceeds of various state-levied taxes,
profits from the state liquor monopoly, and certain rental income with
these political subdivisions. This means that the property tax is the sole
source of tax revenue for the other subdivisions. However, non-tax
sources of income, including federal subsidies, are available to many
such districts.
SouRcEs OF REVENUE: 1937-1964
The executive and legislative branches of state government have been
continously confronted since the latter thirties with the task of form-
ulating, within a rigid constitutional framework, and implementing,
with niggardly support from the voters, a revenue-producing program
which would not only meet the increasing costs of state government but
also provide additional tax revenue and more state assistance to the
local subdivisions of the state. The tax story of this period of approx-
imately three decades has been that of a continuing search for new
sources of state tax revenue and devising means of increasing the
amount derived from the taxes already imposed.
It is, therefore, not surprising to find that eight new taxes, in addition
to those of the "omnibus" Revenue Act of 1935, have been levied for
state purpose. Three of these new taxes were annual excises on the use
of "vehicles" of different kinds, levied in lieu of personal property taxes
141 Wash. Laws 1943, ch. 80, at 165 (cities) and ch. 269, at 835 (counties). Over-
lapping application by city and county is prohibited. If a city levies an admissions
tax, the county admissions tax cannot be applied in the city area.
142 Wash. Laws 1951, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 11, at 108 (1% of sale price).
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on such vehicles. The first of these was the motor vehicle excise, im-
posed on the use of motor vehicles on the highways of the state.'"
Another new tax, first levied in 1941, which is in lieu of property taxes
of all kinds upon the districts taxed, is the public utility district
excise.
1 4
Several more taxes were first levied in 1941. The first of these was a
tax on the transfer of property by gift during the lifetime of the trans-
feror.1 45 There have been no significant changes in this law since its
enactment in 1941 and it has never been challenged in the highest court
of the state. Another new tax levied in 1941 was on the business of
operating certain mechanical devices (pinball machines, slot machines,
and the like)." 6 Still another 1941 tax was the use fuel tax which
applies to motor vehicle fuels such as diesel and other special fuels not
subject to the gasoline tax," and is complementary to the tax on gas-
oline.148
The last in this series of new taxes was imposed in 1959 upon tobacco
products other than cigarettes." 9 And all except one 50 of these state-
levied taxes which became operative 5' since 1933 are still in effect.
The rates applicable to two taxes have been reduced' 52 Without going
into full detail, it suffices to state that the tax rates applicable to every
143 Wash. Laws 1937, ch. 228, at 1167 (1/% of fair market value of the vehicle).
This was raised to 2% in 1959. RCW 82.44.020. From 1943 until 1955, house trailers
were subject to this tax (Wash. Laws 1943, ch. 144, § 1, at 439) then they were
subject to a separate excise tax, Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 139, at 601 (1'A%). In 1957
this was reduced to 1%. RCW 82.52.030. In 1949, an excise tax in lieu of property
tax was levied on aircraft. RCW ch. 82.48 (1%).
144 Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 245, at 809. Presently the rates are 2% of gross revenue
from certain sources and 5% in other instances. RCW ch. 54.28.
145 Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 119, at 308. The governor had vetoed a similar tax in-
cluded in 1935. The gift tax is designed to complement the inheritance tax, and the
method of computing the amount of gift tax follows the same pattern as that for the
inheritance tax. The rates under the gift tax are, however, 90% of the rates appli-
cable under the inheritance tax.146 Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 118, at 305 (10% or 20% of gross operating income de-
pending upon type of machine). The rates were increased to 20% and 40% in 1947.
RCW ch. 8228.
14,7 Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 127, at 363. (Five cents per gallon). Presently 7Y cents
per gallon. RCW 82.40.020.
148 See RCW ch. 82.36.
149 RCW ch. 82.26 (25% of wholesale selling price).
150 The only tax once imposed which has been completely eliminated from the tax
structure is the fuel oil tax of 1935. It wag repealed in 1947. Wash. Laws 1947, ch.
208, at 889. The state-levied admissions tax was repealed, but converted to a county-
city tax; see text accompanying note 141 supra.
151 The net income taxes and the tax on radio broadcasting, which were held un-
constitutional, never became operative. See note 109 supra. Three taxes included in
the Revenue Act of 1935 which were vetoed by the governor have never been re-
imposed. See note 108 supra.
152 The house trailer excise tax. See note 143 supra. The insurance premium tax
rates have been altered three times since 1935, and with respect to certain classes
there has been a reduction in rates. See RCW 48.14 and notes therein.
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major tax levied for state purposes has been substantially increased
during this period. To give a few illustrations, rates applicable to the
retail sales tax and the use tax have gone from two percent to three
percent to three and one-third percent and finally to four percent,'
and the business and occupation tax rates have been increased three
times.' " The cigarette tax rate has been successively increased, in five
steps, from a basic tax at the rate of one cent per pack to a total of
seven cents per pack. 55 Since 1935 the gasoline tax has been increased
from five cents to seven and one-half cents per gallon,'56 and the driver's
license fee has gone from one dollar to four dollars. 5 There have been
a number of changes in the tax imposed upon the sale of intoxicating
liquors by the state liquor control board. At the present these taxes are
at their highest level since 1933.'
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This survey indicates that from a constitutional standpoint the past
thirty-five years of Washington's statehood have been marked by a
series of amendments each of which has operated to reduce the scope of
legislative discretion in the formulation of tax policy. These amend-
ments have also hampered the development of effective administrative
procedures for equality in the enforcement of the property tax, which
still constitutes a major source of combined state and local tax revenues.
The effect of these restrictive amendatory provisions has been amplified
by narrow judicial constructions which have negated legislative efforts,
whether by the voters or by the legislators to broaden the tax base and
force compliance by county officials with the constitutional mandate
that property throughout the state be assessed on the same basis
wherever it is located.
Property tax rate limitations have been strongly condemned by
many, including quite recently the non-partisan federal Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations.'59 This Commission rec-
153 Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, § 16, at 721; Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 76, § 2, at 195,
and § 6, at 198; Wash. Laws 1955, Ex. Sess., ch. 10, §§ 2, 3, at 1750; Wash. Laws
1959, Ex. Sess., ch. 3, § 5, at 1646, and § 10, at 1651; RCW 82.08.020, 82.12.020.
154 Wash. Laws 1951, 2nd Ex. Sess., ch. 28, § 1; Wash. Laws 1953, ch. 91, § 1;
Wash. Laws 1959, Ex. Sess., ch. 5, § 6. RCW 82.04.296.
155 Compare Wash. Laws 1935, ch. 180, § 82 (1 cent per pack) with RCW 8224.010
(7 cents).
156 Compare Wash. Laws 1933, ch. 58, § 5, with RCW 82.36.020.
157 Compare Wash. Laws 1921, ch. 108, § 6, at 324 with RCW 46.20.090.
158 RCW 82.08.150 and notes thereto.
159 This commission was created by Congress in 1959; Pub. Law 86-380, 73 Stat.
703, 5 U.S.C.A. Ch. 35 (1960). It is a permanent, bipartisan body of 26 members and
consists of representatives of federal, state, and local governments. Inter alia, the
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ommends the lifting of both constitutional and statutory limitations on
local power to impose property taxes, stating that such rate limitations
are "inimical to local self-government."'"8 It condemns, in particular,
inclusion, as in this state, of property tax rate limitations in the con-
stitution.
Constitutions should be limited to governing principles, to the exclu-
sion of administrative detail. The solution of problems generated by the
accelerating pace of American society cannot await the time consuming
process of constitutional amendment. We concur with the National
Municipal League that: 'Ideally, a constitution should be silent on the
subject of taxation and finance, thus permitting the legislature and the
governor freedom to develop fiscal policies for the State to meet the
requirements of their time."'"
The Advisory Commission also, condemns another feature of Wash-
ington's constitutional property tax rate limitation, stating that, if a tax
rate limitation is to be imposed, it should be "in terms of the value of
taxable property equalized to full market value rather than fractional
assessed value." Washington's constitutional provision for assessment
of property at fifty per cent of its value is clearly contrary to this state-
ment of principle. In support of its view, the Advisory Committee
points out that "under the usual procedure of applying tax rate limita-
tions to locally assessed values, the assessor is actually a policy maker,
since he determines a locality's property tax revenue by determining
the assessment ratio."
162
Constitutional earmarking of revenues from specified taxes for partic-
ular uses, the constitutional prescription of the percentages of voters
and votes required for a particular electorate to impose upon itself an
additional tax burden, are other illustrations of undesirable minutiae of
Commission is directed to study and "recommend methods of coordinating and simpli-
fying tax laws and administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and less
competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of government and to reduce the
burden of compliance for taxpayers."
16 0 A DvisoRy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CoNsTITu-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRIcroNs ON LocAL TAXING PowEs 6 (1962).
161 Id. at 7. See also 1 ADvIsoRY Commssio ox INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
THE ROLE Or THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 9 (1963).
l62ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LocAL TAXING POWERS 7 (1962). For a
frank evaluation of the extra-legal practices of assessors who completely disregard
constitutional and statutory standards of assessment, see 1 ADVIsoRY CoM-miSSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE
PROPERTY TAX 3, (1963). The following statement is certainly appropriate under
the present state of affairs with respect to Washington's county assessors: "He-not
the State constitution and the State legislature--defines local taxing and borrowing
power and determines the value of a veterans' or homestead tax exemption by the
level at which he decides to assess property." Id. at 4.
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policy that have crept into this state's basic legal document. Another
illustration is the constitutional definition of "property" and the limita-
tions on its classification. As a result of marginal and questionably
supported judicial interpretations of the term "property," any utiliza-
tion of a tax upon or measured by net income has been barred. This
has deprived the people and their elected representatives of the discre-
tion to determine whether such tax is needed to leaven the regressive
characteristics of other taxes in the structure. Finally, the existence of
supposed constitutional limitations barring state-wide equalization of
the property tax base, for all subdivisions of government, have operated
to the detriment of the state as a whole and of its subdivisions, sev-
erally.
Turning now to consideration of the presently-existing congeries of
taxes that constitute Washintgon's tax system, the Tax Commission of
this state, in its most recent biennial report, has summed up the situa-
tion as follows:
Washington has a tax structure that relies heavily on sales and gross
receipts taxes, uses property taxes to a lesser extent than most states and
does not use net income taxes at all.
Washington is often referred to as a 'sales tax state.' Clearly this is an
appropriate term, as sales and gross receipts type taxes, which include, in
addition to the retail sales and business and occupation taxes, such selec-
tive sales tax sourcs as those imposed upon motor fuels, liquor, tobacco
products and pari-mutuel betting, account for nearly 83% of Washing-
ton's state tax revenue and 60.7% of the total state-local tax revenues.
Measured against other states in this respect, Washington's heavy
reliance [upon sales and gross receipts taxes] at the state level is ex-
ceeded by only two states, Indiana and Illinois. When state tax revenues
of all states are combined, the reliance upon such sales and gross receipts
taxes is computed at 58%. When state and local tax revenues are com-
bined for all states, sales and gross receipts taxes account for only 32.8o
of the total as compared to 60.7% in Washington.' 63
Notwithstanding the several constitutional restrictions and the
limiting judicial interpretations previously discussed, the total tax rev-
enues derived by the State of Washington and its local subdivisions do
not appear to have been greatly diminished below what they might have
been without these restrictive provisions. At least by comparision with
other states, Washington's state and local tax collections for a typical
year seem to be well in line with the total taxes collected in other states.
163 19 WASHINGTON STATE TAX COMm'N BIENNIAL REPORT AND 1962 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE TAX Co MIssIoN 29 (1962).
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In 1961, for example, Washington's total collections, state and local,
ranked nineteenth among the fifty states, on the basis of tax collections
per thousand dollars of personal income'" The stringent limitations of
the constitutional provisions did not effect the amount of taxes actually
collected but rather the types of taxes levied and upon what agency
levied and collected the bulk of the taxes. In 1960 the state collected
and distributed to the local subdivisions of government more than forty
percent of the total local government revenue.'65 Forty-two states con-
tributed a smaller percentage to their local subdivisions. Whether such
dependence upon the state government, and the vagaries of its largesse,
is desirable or undesirable, is a matter upon which reasonable people
may differ. However, all would agree that policy decisions on such
matters should be made after careful consideration of the relative
merits of the several alternatives, rather than forced as a by-product of
restrictive constitutional provisions originally sold to the voters on a
completely different basis.
Washington, formerly rural in character and economically dependent
upon agriculture and its native resources of fish and lumber, is now
industrially based, with growing reliance on modem technology. Its
population, rapidly increasing, is concentrating within sprawling urban
complexes, which are costly to maintain. Its citizens have become ac-
customed to ever-increasing levels of production and income and have
more hours available for recreational and other leisure-time activities.
There is every reason to believe that their demands upon both state and
local governments for services and benefits will continue to expand.
Existing constitutional restrictions, which have produced revenue prob-
lems and imbalances previously discussed, will certainly magnify the
stresses which will arise out of demands for even more governmental
services. Major surgery upon the basic framework is needed if there is
to be any expectation of remedying present ills and making it possible
for the citizens of this state, and their elected representatives, to
provide the type of government services which the people themselves
desire.
164 Id. at 28.
15 AmwsoRy Comm= oN INTEGovERNm:ENTAL RELAIONS, LocAL Nonop PE
TAXES AND THE COORDINATIN ROLE OF TEE STATES 16 (1961) Table 6.
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